Introduction
Economics claims to be first and foremost about choice and human praxis in the 'ordinary business of life' and their implications on the wider social systems they produce and upon which they depend. Human agents constantly have to take decisions and make plans which are based on current knowledge and on an assessment of their present and future circumstances as well as the likely consequences of their actions. To this end, they apply reason to their circumstances. However, reason is not enough. Economic agents confront a myriad limitations in coping with their problem situations and somehow need to adapt their reason to the intractabilities of their circumstances. This is a fact that defies the application of reason as a process that can be represented as pure logic (Oakley, 1999A) . In effect, agents can have no more than a partial knowledge of their circumstances, and this is not simply a problem of lacking knowledge regarding which state-contingent possibility will occur, given a well-known probability distribution; the full set of possibilities is also unknown and unknowable. In addition to operating within the context of complex systems, human actions occur in historical time. There cannot be absolute knowledge regarding the future, which is still to come at the moment decisions are taken. Reason and imagination, as Shackle made us aware, are the two faculties that make us human. Decisions concerning the future must rely on creative imagination and expectations formed through knowledge and experience. In this way, deliberated choices emerge from an 'open-ended set of alternative scenarios' (Oakley, ibid.) . This means that choice is only meaningful in an open world. In a determinist world, it is inappropriate to speak of choice (Shackle, 1972, p. 122) . But social systems are inherently open because agents have the ability to reproduce social structures and transform them through more or less consciously reflected actions. Fundamental uncertainty is unavoidable; it is a pervasive fact of life. Neither the actions of agents nor their study can be fully informed; the same is true regarding the social implications of agents' actions. The theory of choice, as Loasby (1976) made us aware, must be incomplete.
The implication is that we cannot avoid facing the dilemma of how to reconcile the exigencies of theoretical determinateness with the relative indeterminacy of human conduct and the openness of the world. Mainstream economics has emphasised scientistic 1 goals and has avoided this dilemma simply by ignoring the relevance of ontological concern. The discipline is overwhelmed by a commitment to formal, closed-system modelling (understood as a universal method of analysis), rather than trying to attain the maximum degree of ontological integrity and realism in the discipline's analytical representations. But economics is not a hard science (in the sense that the term is normally understood), and there is no hope of it ever becoming one. It is an art of reasoned thought (see Earl and Frowen, 2000) : an indispensable scaffold we use to understand the realities of the world we live in.
Economics has made extensive use of the method of situational analysis in its search for explanations regarding choice and human conduct. Situational analysis (SA) is arguably a congenial metatheory for a social science such as economics (Oakley, 2002) . Caldwell (1998) and others have claimed that it is the method of mainstream microeconomic theory, and Langlois (1986) offered it as a key component of his proposed research programme on institutional economics. As articulated by Popper, SA is the method of logical or rational reconstruction of social situations. Since its early formulations, the methodology of SA has been identified with situational logic: that is, explanations of typical individual actions in terms of single logical responses to ideal typical situations, involving the postulate that agents always act appropriately given their situation and in a way that is consistent with the covering-law model of scientific explanation. Recently, however, the relationship between SA and the standard covering-law model of scientific explanation has started to be questioned (e.g., Runde, 1999; Finch, 2000 ; and even a firm supporter of the covering-law model, the late Csontos, acknowledged that such a relationship deserves further, more thorough discussion: see Csontos, 2000) . Richard Langlois has consistently struggled to provide sound foundations for his version of SA (the 'single-exit' modelling approach), which he has been at pains to show enables researchers to provide determinate explanations without compromising agents' free will or turning them into ciphers. This 'single-exit' modelling approach is currently the most sophisticated version of SA.
It is my argument, however, that the 'single-exit' modelling approach to SA is unable to provide a full account of social action in 'multiple-exit' problem situations, and that its failure is primarily due to its commitment to the narrow, closed-system, deductivist view of economic explanation. In my view, a broader, realist SA is needed.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I shall examine the origins of SA. Popper's situational logic will be characterised as an instance of the deductive-nomological model of explanation in economics. In Section 3, the 'single-exit' modelling approach of Langlois and his colleagues will be scrutinised. I argue that the Popperian-Langloisian approach to SA is epistemologically driven, resulting in an ontologically unsound venture, which does not take full account of the ontological implications of real time or fundamental uncertainty (considering the human realm as essentially open-ended and nondeterministic). Situational logic, I maintain, does not provide an adequate solution to the problem of explaining human action in 'multiple-exit' situations, i.e., situations in which no single optimum solution follows simply from the 'logic of situation'. As Shackle frequently argued (for instance, Shackle, 1972) , representations of agent reasoning as closed and logical are problematical. In Section 4, I shall attempt to push SA beyond such 'singleexit' modelling. I shall maintain that a fully consistent methodology of SA, free from the constraints of situational logic and firmly grounded on sound realist ontological foundations, can be effective if it is detached from the rationality principle; if closed-system modelling is abandoned; and if a retroductive mode of inference is embraced. The final section summarises the argument.
2. The origins of situational analysis: Popper's SA-RP metatheory 1 SA was originally proposed by Karl Popper 2 as a method of logical or rational reconstruction of the actions of agents in social situations. Popper's basic heuristic was that the explanation of social phenomena should be sought as a logical response of individuals to the objective situations in which they find themselves. In order to explain and understand a certain kind or type of social event, the Popperian prescription is to reconstruct the problem situation faced by a typical agent in such a manner that a single action can be deemed as the appropriate or reasonable response to that situation. The social researcher must construct a model of a typical social situation (in which typical initial conditions, 'aims' and 'knowledge' of the typical agent are described) 3 and, in order to 'animate' the model, that is to make it function, a rationality principle (RP) must be assumed according to which agents always act adequately or appropriately to the 'logic of the situation' in which they find themselves (Popper, 1985, pp. 357-9) . 1 I shall use interchangeably the expression 'situational logic' and the symbols 'SA-RP' (from Situational Analysis-Rationality Principle) to designate Popper's metatheory. The adoption of Allen Oakley's 'SA-RP' symbolism is meant to emphasise the possibility (and desirability), argued below, that SA be detached from the Popperian RP and pursed free from the constraints of situational logic. 2 Popper introduced SA (or situational logic) in his The Poverty of Historicism, originally published in the 1940s, and made some incursions into the subject thereafter, namely in The Open Society and Its Enemies. However, his most developed analysis is to be found in The Rationality Principle (1985) and in his Models, Instruments and Truth: The Status of the Rationality Principle in the Social Sciences (1994), a revised version of a lecture delivered to an economics audience in the Department of Economics of Harvard University in 1963. 3 The idea of typification is indeed central in the Popperian proposal of SA (see Popper, 1985 Popper, [1967 , pp. 357-9). But, as Allen Oakley pointed out to me, Popper left the idea relatively underdeveloped in comparison to Schutz, for example. Popper did not provide any ontological justification for its use. Typification is a strategy used by agents and its manifestation in the context of SA should be justified on that basis, rather than stated as a self-evident methodological requirement.
Although the intellectual lineage of the methodology of SA goes back to Weber's method of objective rational interpretation and his construction of ideal types 1 ( Jacobs, 1990; Langlois, 1998) , Popper claimed it was a result of his admiration for economic theory: it constituted 'an attempt to generalize the method of economic theory (marginal utility theory) so as to become applicable to the other theoretical social sciences ' (2002 [1974] , p. 135). In Popper (1985, p. 358) , he went so far as to maintain that situational logic was the sole method of explanation in the social sciences. While this is a very contentious statement (see Caldwell, 1991 Caldwell, , 1998 , it is undeniable that, even if economics is not entirely microeconomics or explanations of individual action, virtually all microeconomic explanations are constructed in terms of logical outcomes of ideal typical situations 'animated' by a rationality postulate. Latsis (1972) argued that the whole of neoclassical economics was simply an instance of Popper's situational logic (he called it situational determinism). Caldwell (1998) has endorsed the view that SA is the method of mainstream microeconomic theory, and argued, in his 'Presidential Address' to the History of Economics Society 2000 Conference, that:
A huge number of theories-monopolistic competition, game theory, information theory, bounded rationality, the list goes on and on-started out as challenges to mainstream economics and ended up being incorporated into it. Why is this so? I think that if one views mainstream microeconomic theory as a variant of Popper's SA, the answer becomes evident. Most of the innovations mentioned above consist simply of reconfigurations of certain of the initial conditions of a SA. SA is very adaptable, and by following its strictures economics has been able to adapt to the changing times. (Caldwell, 2000, pp. 16-17) This is indeed an important insight. In the meantime, several limitations, ambiguities and inconsistencies have been pointed out in Popper's SA-RP metatheory, mostly centred on the status of the RP and the issue of how to put SA to work in social science. A seminal contribution to introducing situational logic into economic methodology and in characterising some of Popper's weaknesses was given by Hands (1985) . Caldwell (1991) provided an excellent survey of the various contradictory interpretations of the RP that can be found in Popper's writings. Three broad interpretations of the RP have been identified, namely: (1) all agents act appropriately to the situation as they see it, i.e., the RP is understood as an unfalsifiable universal statement; (2) that the RP is the equivalent of a universal law for the social sciences, and as such it is a falsifiable and recognisably false statement; (3) that it is a methodological principle, known not to be true but nevertheless a good approximation to the truth, which has been shown to be useful in the past. Popper's defence of the RP is indeed quite ambiguous ('ambiguous at best and evasive at worst' as Oakley, 1999B, p. 27 contended) . Caldwell (1991, p. 21) concluded that Popper's own writings are of 'absolute no use' in clarifying which of the three interpretations should be chosen, and that Popper 'obfuscates all of the important questions'.
Besides the amazing number of (potentially contradictory) characterisations Popper provided for his abstract and universal RP, there are also a number of puzzling tensions that have been noted between Popper's SA-RP metatheory and other parts of his work. A number of authors (e.g., Hands, 1985; Caldwell 1991) have argued that it is hard to square the RP with Popper's own vision of the 'unity of method' (methodological monism) and his long-standing defence of falsificationism. Caldwell (1991) , however, convincingly argued that the apparent tension detected in Popper's writings on situational logic and falsificationism can be illuminated (and a more coherent position found) if one applies Popper's own views on critical rationalism, arguably the most fundamental part of his philosophy. It has also been shown that SA coupled with the RP in the context of the deductivenomological framework is inconsistent with Popper's views on determinism presented in A World of Propensities (Runde, 1999) . Oakley (1999B) remarked upon the inconsistency between Popper's instrumentalist metatheory for the social sciences and his avid opposition to instrumentalism.
The importance of identifying and trying to sort out Popper's inconsistencies and puzzling tensions seems unquestionable; but more relevant for a practising economist, is the way that SA gets put to work. Here Popper's writings have also been found to be quite vague. The Popperian philosopher Noretta Koertge suggested a reformulation of Popper's SA-RP within the deductive-nomological scheme of explanation (with the RP as the 'animating law', equivalent to a universal covering-law). In such a framework, the action to be explained (the explanandum) is deduced from the explanans, which is itself constituted from the description of the situation and the analysis of the situation, with the RP enabling the logical deduction. The SA-RP scheme then becomes (Koertge, 1975, p. 440 ): 1 1. Description of the situation: agent A was in a situation of type C. 2. Analysis of the situation: in a situation of type C, the appropriate thing to do is X. 3. Rationality principle: agents always act appropriately to their situations. 4. Explanandum: (therefore) A did X.
It should be noted that if, as Langlois and Csontos (1993) emphasise, the explanandum in economics is not individual behaviour per se but social phenomena-the unintended or unexpected consequences of intentional human action-then the explanation of individual behaviour cannot be more than a link in a broader explanatory chain that Popper has never explained. Mäki (1993, p. 38 ) also stated that SA must be supplemented by something else if social outcomes of individual intentional action are to be explained. Langlois and Csontos (1993, p. 126 ) made reference to the need for 'some compositional principle' if social outcomes are to be explained from individual 'appropriately specified' behaviour, but they have never clarified exactly what that compositional principle should be.
3. 'Multiple-exit' situations and the quest for theoretical determinateness: the single-exit modelling approach A fundamental methodological tenet of situational logic, as the deductivist formulation of Koertge clearly shows, is the prescription to find a single, reasonable, logical, response to the problem situation in which agents find themselves. A crucial presupposition of Popper's SA-RP metatheory is that agents not only pursue their interests by applying 1 The explanatory framework of SA is identical to the one known under the label of 'folk psychological theory'. The latter explains an action 'by bringing it under some such a generalisation as the following: [L] If an agent desires goal g, and believes that action a is the best way of attaining g, then, ceteris paribus, the agent will do action a' (Rosenberg, 1998, p. 195) . Actually, such a similarity led Hands (2001, p. 336 ) to remark that '[i]t is ironic that there exists such a massive philosophical literature surrounding folk psychology and [L] explanations, and there also exists an essentially parallel (smaller, but equally spirited) literature in the Popperian tradition surrounding SA and the RP, and yet those two literatures seem to exist in hermetic (supercilious?) isolation from each other.' reason to their circumstances, but that they are also able to find single reasonable, logical, responses to their problem situations. This enables the analyst to build models in which those unique responses emerge as the only reasonable outcomes from the logic of the agent's situation. Of course, if reasonable is to be understood as the best response, then that presupposition entails that the agents are rational, fully informed, optimisers. Otherwise, no single solution could be found. As Shackle observed many years ago:
To act by reason, a man must be fully informed of his circumstances as far as they bear on the outcome of his action. For a circumstance whose character he does not know, but which by being one thing or the other will affect what he achieves, must leave him in doubt of his best course. Whatever course he chooses will then not be demonstrably the unique best one. (1972, p. 91, original emphasis) Such an understanding led Shackle to the position that rationality 'is an empty and idle term until the data available to the individual are specified' (ibid., p. 37). The problem, however, is that there can be no full information except about what is past, or else about what is exempt from the world of time altogether. The paradox of rationality is that it must concern itself with choosing amongst things fully known; but in the world of time, only that is fully known which is already beyond the reach of choice, having already become actual and thus knowable. Rational choice, it seems, must be confined to timeless matters. (ibid., pp. 245-6, original emphasis) Latsis (1972 Latsis ( , 1976 seriously challenged the feasibility of closed logical explanations in the social realm with his consideration of 'multiple-exit' situations, i.e., situations where no single obvious best course of action may be prescribed by the structure of the situation. Latsis provided the following illustrative example of a situation where the 'logic of the situation' is unlikely to identify one single action among the numerous available alternatives:
[C]onsider a small investor's decision to invest his money. Suppose that the investor in question has just inherited this sum of money, that he has little or no understanding of the stock market and indeed of most other markets, and that he cannot articulate his preference map. He knows, however, that unless he does something with his money, it will depreciate at a yearly rate of about 30 per cent. How can we predict his subsequent behaviour? Or how can we explain it a week or a month later? It is clear that by reconstructing the agent's appraisal of his preferences and his situation we shall not get very far. Adding the assumption that he wants to maximize his returns from his outlays will be little help: there may still be a large number of alternative ways of investing open to him, and the logic of his situation is unlikely to single one of them out . . . Even with the help of expert advice, though he may be able to eliminate possibly disastrous alternatives, he will be left with an unmanageable variety of others. (1976, pp. 20-1, original emphasis) Latsis' argument was that the more varied the feasible outcomes (or exits), the more difficult it becomes to account for action in terms of the RP. As Loasby (1976, pp. 1-4) also noted, the greater the complexity of the phenomena, the more difficult it is to manage them; 'bounded' rationality, the Simonian concept of a limited human data-processing ability, is a more reasonable notion of rationality than the assumption of infinite capacity when it comes to handling infinite quantities of data.
Since at least 1986, Richard Langlois has consistently struggled to provide solid foundations for the single-exit modelling approach to SA, one that he has been at pains to show enables researchers to generate determinate theory-based conjectures that are empirically falsifiable (at least in principle) without compromising agents' free will or turning them into a cipher (e.g., Langlois, 1986 Langlois, , 1998 Langlois and Koppl, 1991; Langlois and Csontos, 1993) . How is this obtained? The answer is unambiguous:
[T]he method of SA attempts to achieve determinate results without overtly compromising the free will of the economic agent. If an agent has genuine free will, how can we be sure what he or she will do? The SL [situational logic] approach answers this question by placing the hypothetical (and free) agent in a situation that guides behaviour along determinate lines, and by assuming that the agent is able and willing to evaluate the situation and to choose, from among the set of perceived alternatives, the most desirable course of action. (Langlois and Csontos, 1993, p. 118, emphasis added) Langlois and Csontos' prescribed solution to the problem of a single-action response from the agent is to 'close down the exits' (p. 125). This is achieved in two complementary ways: (1) by endowing the agent with a richer decision-making apparatus than the one considered in neoclassical economics, that is by 'thickening up the agent's rationality' and (2) by altering the structure of the situation, e.g., by importing rules, habits, conventions and other social institutions, which are made part of the 'givens' of the agent's problem situation. In this manner, the agent would act as if logically coerced by his or her preferences and knowledge, as well as by the social institutional environment, to make a particular decision.
Can such a research programme achieve successful results in dealing with 'multiple-exit' situations as in Latsis' example of the small unskilled investor? I do not believe so. Actually, it may not be fortuitous that, in the continuation of the above quotation from Langlois and Csontos, the authors opted for discussing Latsis' example of a spectator at a football game instead of that of the small unskilled investor, where the problems of knowledge and information were more acute (to my knowledge, the second example has always been sidestepped). According to Runde (1999, p. 79) , the scope of SA (understood as situational logic) will depend on the transparency of 'the logic of the situation' and the extent to which rationality can be assigned to human actors in each particular situation (in his view, the prospects for SA explanations of social phenomena such as high levels of uncertainty or mass hysteria are rather limited).
In my view, the single-exit modelling approach does not provide an adequate solution to the problem of 'multiple-exit' situations. In effect, even if the agent is willing to evaluate the situation, how can the most desirable course of action be singled out as the most reasonable one when the nature of the agent's circumstances prevents him or her from knowing what this most desirable course of action is? As Allen Oakley emphasises, economic agents confront a myriad limitations in coping with their problem situations and somehow adapt their reason to the intractabilities of their circumstances, a fact that defies the application of reason as a process that can be represented as pure logic (Oakley, 1999A) .
It is clear that Langlois and his colleagues have made a significant contribution to the application of SA in economics. It is also clear that they do not ignore either the existence of 'multiple-exit' situations or the problem of uncertainty, and that their suggestion to 'thicken up' the agent's rationality and to integrate social institutions is a movement in the right direction. However, their approach, overwhelmed by a concern to generate determinate conclusions and being focused on closing off the 'exits', does not take full account of the implications of real time and 'fundamental' uncertainty: of considering the human realm as essentially open-ended and non-deterministic. I believe that the key issue at stake here is the specific understanding given to the widely accepted view that scientific enquiry demands a particular type of determinateness. According to this perspective, if an action is to be fully explained, the model must be constructed in such a way that it gives a full account of why that particular action (and no other) happened. The action must be deduced as a single response from the model. Otherwise, it cannot be considered explained.
1 Langlois (1989, p. 280 ) echoes this point of view when, elaborating on the inherent difficulties of explanation in social theory, he says: 'Since humans have free-will, their conduct is indeterminate; but theory demands determinateness: assumptions must lead to conclusions. SA compromises by creating this kind of ''conditional'' determinateness.' Theoretical determinateness is thus reduced to a specific type of predictability, that is, predictability at the level of events.
The problem is that cogent explanations demand more than logical rigour, and substantive content is more important than analytical formalism. As Oakley reminds us, the capacity of agents to be rational depends primarily on the character of the circumstances in which they find themselves and 'in order to devise reasoned action responses to problems that are fully in accordance with the inherent logic of their circumstances, agents must be shown to have complete knowledge of what those circumstances are as far as they are relevant to the problem ' (2002, p. 21) . Otherwise, no reasonable 'single-exit' may be devised. The fundamental point is that any representation of the reasoning and deliberations of agents as a closed logical argument is problematical.
Certainly, it might be argued, the single-exit approach can be thought of as no more than a mental model, or thought experiment, intended to get a theoretical closure, parallel to the experiments conducted by the hard physical sciences, necessary to achieve theoretical determinateness. But then, the crucial question, as Chick and Dow (2001) remarked, becomes: what is the relationship between our theory and our concept of reality, that is our ontology? My argument is that SA as situational logic is an epistemologically motivated but ontologically unsound venture, which cannot be squared with a vast and growing body of metatheoretical thought which spans from the classical contributions of G. L. S. Shackle, J. M. Keynes, F. A. von Hayek and B. Loasby to some more recent, important developments on human and social ontology, uncertainty and open-system theorising, coming from contributors of various heterodox traditions. Any scientific enquiry (including economics) should be based on a sound understanding of the fundamental nature of the phenomena observed and be designed to retain the maximum degree of ontological integrity. As such, the 'single-exit' project, which aims to provide SA with sound foundations, is doomed to failure.
Situational analysis beyond single-exit modelling: a quest for ontological integrity
The previous section cast serious doubts on the prospects for situational logic as an ontologically grounded approach to the explanation of economic phenomena. Does this mean that we have to give up SA altogether? Not necessarily. In my view, a fruitful, fully consistent and ontologically grounded SA, free from the constraints of situational logic, is possible as long as it is detached from the Rationality Principle and the closed-system modelling approach is abandoned in favour of a retroductive mode of inference: that is, a creative movement of devising a theory, which goes from manifest phenomena to the causal tendencies, or necessary relations, that govern them.
A crucial feature of the 'single-exit' approach to SA, as noticed above, is the endorsement of the position that an action is only fully explained if it can be deduced as a single response from a researcher's model. This follows from the adoption of the 'covering-law' model of scientific explanation, or the 'deductivist' mode of theorising. My contention is that such a model is particularly inadequate in the human realm. If one believes that the world and its constituent sub-systems have a characteristic way of functioning, that there are ontic necessities and impossibilities in the world, and that scientific theories should depict the causal processes that constitute the way the world works, i.e., its inner workings (Mäki, 2001) , then methods must be fashioned to grasp that ontic reality. Ontology should have primacy over epistemological issues; questions of knowledge must be subordinated to questions of being. As Allen Oakley pointed out to me, to refer to SA as having no more than methodological status is understating its profound significance for understanding the ontology of human action. SA is an ontological phenomenon, prior to its use as a method of analysis. As a mode of accounting for human action, SA has its roots in what agents do themselves. SA is a strategy that is actually employed by agents in their dealings with their circumstances and problem-situations. It is this ontic reality that SA as a method of analysis should grasp.
Scientific inquiry as closed-system modelling: the intrinsic and extrinsic conditions for a closure
According to the covering-law model, the explanandum in a scientific explanation is conceived of as a logical and necessary consequence of the explanans; this logical necessity is guaranteed by the requirement that the explanandum be deductively subsumed under (conjectured) universal laws. The model guarantees that, under a given set of determinate conditions (or variables) x, some predictable outcome y results.
Meanwhile, critical realist philosophy urges us to ask the question: What must the real world (natural and human) be like for such things to be possible or make sense? Or, rephrasing the question: what is the ontology implicitly presumed, or at least demanded, by that mode of reasoning? The critical realist argument is that the 'deductivist' approach necessitates pervasive local closures (situations in which deterministic or probabilistic constant conjunctions of events or states of affairs prevail), which in turn requires that both the intrinsic and extrinsic conditions for closure be satisfied.
The intrinsic condition for a closure demands that 'some set of restrictions on the intrinsic structure, organisation or nature of any (and every) individual of analysis . . . guarantees that a given set of conditioning factors, x 1 . . . x n , exert a constant effect on y, the outcome variable of interest' (Lawson, 1997, p. 78) . Such a condition requires both the individual object of analysis to have an intrinsic or internal constant structure (intrinsic constancy), and its structure or organisation to be such that 'for any given intrinsic state and set of conditions of action, only one outcome or ''exit'' is possible, and one that is predictable from a knowledge of the prevailing set of conditions' (ibid., p. 79), i.e., reducibility.
The extrinsic condition for closure requires the system of interest be fenced-off from any potential, but not explicitly identified or accounted for, intervening, influence, which means to guarantee 'that only the explicitly elaborated conditions x 1 , x 2 . . . x n have a systematic, non-constant, influence on the outcome event y in question' (ibid., p. 99).
According to Lawson, the intrinsic condition for closure has been achieved in mainstream economics by means of characterising atomistically the individuals of analysis and reducing them to mere reactors to external impinging forces or stimuli by:
(1) making human individuals more or less the only unit of analysis, (2) characterising human nature in such a way that such individuals are only and always 'economically rational', i.e., economic optimisers (thus achieving intrinsic constancy), and (3) specifying some objective (utility, preference, profit) function as fixed and permitting of a (locally at least) unique optimum and so single course of action (ensuring outcome reducibility). (Lawson, 1997, p. 100) On the other hand, the extrinsic condition for closure is attempted by treating each agent as acting within an isolated and typically highly limited fixed set of conditions. Thus the focus is usually upon buyers and sellers interacting in a quite impersonal way in their attempts to satisfy their preferences in situations more or less completely specified by given endowments and prices. (Ibid., p. 101) Does such a strategy enable one to achieve the maximum degree of ontological integrity?
The causal model of explanation
Local closures, at least outside astronomy, are usually restricted to experimental situations. In the human realm, these are relatively rare. Attempts at closure, as Lawson argues, are generally doomed to failure. Shackle, for instance in his Epistemics and Economics (1972), has already provided us with some deep-rooted realistic ontological foundations for why this is so. It is true that institutions, as enduring social structures, 'durable systems of established and embedded social rules and conventions that structure social interactions' (Hodgson, 2000A, p. 5) , which are simultaneously objective realities 'out there' and intersubjective mental models 'in here' (shared, or at least mutually consistent, cognitive processes and habits of thought), provide conditions for stable human behaviour and produce states of 'quasi-closure ' (Downward et al., 1999) . Institutions and their routines, Hodgson (2000A, p. 10) maintains, are used as templates in the construction of our intentions and choices. But if choice is real, and real time (to be distinguished from logical time) is fully taken on board, the social world can only be open. Though relatively enduring event regularities (usually just partial, rough and ready regularities, often limited to some region of time-space, what Lawson has labelled demi-regularities) may emerge and are essential for the scientific process, they are far from being ubiquitous.
If a structured, multi-layered, ontology of an open reality is assumed (an ontology where each of the three constitutive domains of reality-the 'deep', the 'actual' and the 'empirical'-is irreducible to, and can be out of phase, unsynchronised, with the others), scientific explanations should not be concerned so much with elaborate patterns or regularities at the level of actual events-the surface phenomena-but should rather identify and understand the deeper causal processes that generate these epiphenomena. According to this reasoning, explaining a phenomenon means searching for its mode of production, which involves revealing its real causes (determining factors) or conditions of possibility and its generating mechanisms. This has been called the causal model of explanation (Runde, 1998, p. 152) . In the human realm, in particular, the broad aim of economic explanations should be, in a significant way, to identify and understand social structures, relationships, capacities and other real conditions that govern, facilitate, or in some way produce, actual relevant social events and states of affairs. The identification of demi-regularities is just a starting-point for economic explanation, not its end.
1 The responsibility for economic explanation is put on retroduction (or abduction), a specific mode of inference which 'consists in the movement (on the basis of analogy and metaphor amongst other things) from a conception of some phenomenon of interest to a conception of some totally different type of thing, mechanism, structure or condition that is responsible for the given phenomenon' (Lawson, 1994, p. 264) .
The stress put on the significance of generating mechanisms at the 'deep' level does not mean that the possibility that events play a causal role is denied. Lawson acknowledged this causal role of events, in an explicit answer to Boylan and O'Gorman's (1999, p. 143) charge that critical realism would fail to give due recognition to events as 'indispensable constituents of real causal webs in the economy'. In his words:
I do argue that the primary aim of science and explanation is to identify and understand underlying structures, capacities and mechanisms, etc., which causally bear upon (facilitate, influence, produce) surface phenomena, including events, of interest. But this in no way compromises a recognition that events too are causal. In the social world, indeed, the moving forces upon which everything turns are human practices. Even the reproduction and transformation of social structures are events of sorts. (Lawson, 1999, p. 233) Keeping in mind that any social phenomena to be explained will be either the result of, or consist in, some forms of human activity, Lawson considers that 'the explananda of the social realm, the phenomena to be explained, are the practices in which people engage, and the explanans are the physical, social and psychological conditions of the relevant actions ' (1997, p. 193) . It should be emphasised that, if the practices in which people engage are the object of analysis, due attention should be given to the mental and cognitive processes which underlie human action. As Oakley rightly maintained, 'the creative mental processes of the active agents comprise an integral part of the ''deep'' ontology underpinning object actions or events. These processes have an existential status that is highly subjectivist but no less real than the intransitive dimensions within which they are situated' (Oakley, 1999C, p. 15) .
In this context, an important issue is the conceptualisation of the human-agency/socialstructure relationship. Neither human agency nor social structure can be reduced to, identified with, or completely explained in terms of, the other. As such, conceptions of society as solely a creation of individuals, or of individual action as fully determined by the social structure, are untenable. Individualism and collectivism, as two extreme methodological duals, must both be rejected. Bhaskar (1998 Bhaskar ( [1979 ) provided a significant contribution to a non-reductionist conceptualisation of the agency-structure connection with his Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA).
1 According to this model, both society and human praxis have a dual character. The social structure (rules, positions, relations and the like) pre-exists and is an ever-present (typically unacknowledged) condition (material cause) of any intentional act. But only at the moment one acts might it be interpreted as given. Social structure is continuously reproduced and transformed through the action of individuals taken as a whole (and, as such, it is also an outcome of human agency). This is the duality of structure. On the other hand, human praxis is simultaneously conscious, motivated production (that is, driven by reasons) and typically unintentional, unmotivated reproduction of society. This is the duality of praxis. As Bhaskar put the issue: 'people, in their conscious activity, for the most part unconsciously reproduce (and occasionally transform) the structures governing their substantive activities of production.
Thus people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or work to sustain the capitalist economy. Yet it is nevertheless the unintended consequence (and inexorable result) of, as it is also a necessary condition for, their activity' (Bhaskar, 1998 (Bhaskar, [1979 , p. 35).
Explaining social phenomena thus involves the identification of the (usually unacknowledged) structural conditions of human practices, as well as understanding their conscious and unconscious motivations, the tacit skills drawn upon, and the unintended consequences of those practices.
Recently, Hodgson (2000A, B) , also drawing upon a multi-layered, structured ontology (in which existence of emergent properties and causal powers at the structural level are assumed), argued that if it is true that individuals and social structure are mutually constitutive, a reconstitutive downward causation of structure upon agents should also be acknowledged. In his view, seeing social structure as merely a condition of social activity does not fully take into account the fact that institutions (a specific type of social structure) not only enable or restrain individual action, but also have the 'capacity to mould and change individual dispositions and aspirations ' (2000A, p. 6, emphasis added) . A reductionist structural determinism (where individual dispositions or behaviour would be entirely explained in terms of institutions or other system-wide determinants) is avoided by assuming that higher-level factors (such as institutions) do not control, disrupt or intervene in the causal relations of the downward individual level, but limit their influence to initiating new perceptions and dispositions within individuals. This way, Hodgson maintains, '[b]y acting not directly on individual decisions, but on habitual dispositions, institutions exert downward causation without reducing individual agency to their effects. Furthermore, upward causation, from individuals to institutions, is still possible, without assuming that the individual is given or immanently conceived. Explanations are reduced neither to individuals nor to institutions alone' (Hodgson, 2000A, p. 15 ).
The causal model of explanation having been outlined, we are now ready to conclude our assessment of the possibilities of pursuing a non-deductivist version of SA that is compatible with the way real-world agents go about managing the complexities of their lifeworld circumstances.
Situational analysis as an open-ended method of discovery
If one accepts the view that explaining a phenomenon means searching for its mode of production, revealing its real causes or conditions of possibility and its generating mechanisms, the Langloisian concern with making theoretical determinateness at the level of social events and agents' free-will compatible, and the consequent emphasis on closing-off the exits of the deductivist 'single-exit' approach, loses much of its importance. A more fruitful non-deterministic alternative SA methodology, free from the constraints of deductivism, may evolve as part of open-system theorising. This would entail significant changes in the general explanatory approach.
The traditional starting premise of mainstream economics is that human practices are necessarily rational. A realist and non-deductivist SA would not assume that human practices are rational, but rather that they are intelligible. This implies that rationality be understood 'as a capacity people have that may itself be actualised to different degrees, depending on the situation concerned' (Runde, 1999, p. 74) rather than an 'animating law', the equivalent to a universal covering-law, or a formal methodological principle as in the Popperian-Langloisian RP. It must be noted that, according to the critical realist ontology, potentials and actualities must be distinguished. Against the actualism of the deductivist economic methodology (conflation of the three levels of reality at the level of events), where a potential is reduced to its exercise and its exercise identified with its actualisation, critical realism asserts that potentials may or may not be exercised, and if exercised they may or may not be actualised because of countervailing tendencies. As Lawson (1997, p. 106) 
emphasises:
Although human beings seem to possess a capacity to act rationally, we may not always seek to exercise this capacity, and even when we do our actions may be dominated by some rather irrational and other counter-tendencies, ones we may even regret as soon as they are expressed. The fundamental error of orthodox theory here, at least where realisticness is a goal, is not its focus upon such conceptions as rationality or profit seeking per se; the problem is its presumption that such matters, at some level at least, are always expressed in terms of actualities rather than capacities. And with the need to pre-specify one 'actuality' when many are really possible, the usual choice has been the situation in which some narrowly conceived 'economic goal' is achieved. In the context of specific economic models, agents have usually ended up optimising something; a potential is reduced to its exercise and its exercise successfully actualised.
In effect, most economically relevant decisions (and the consequent behaviour) are not the product of a single type of calculation but are complicated compromises that incorporate different criteria and value systems. In addition, as Runde (2000), drawing on the writings of the philosopher John Searle, emphasised, intentional causation does not exhaust all sources of human action; non-intentional 'Background' capacities also take part to various degrees.
Another major component of this new SA approach is the emphasis on a retroductive mode of inference.
1 This means that, in order to undertake an investigation of the practices in which people engage, one must start from the description and analysis of the situation in which agents find themselves and try to identify and understand the physical, social and psychological conditions that make those practices possible, and the relevant actions intelligible. Instead of producing a scheme where a given set of determinate conditions (or variables) x, leads with logical necessity to a predictable outcome y, the goal is to construct a carefully argued, meaningful analytical narrative of human actions and their conditions of possibility.
In this way, SA can be pursued as a heuristic approach, a method of discovery, consistent with our own world-view, rather than as a formalistic model of explanation overwhelmed by the concern for mirroring what is traditionally seen as the methodology of the physical sciences and with considerations of mathematical tractability. The adoption of a scenarios approach (constructing rival scenarios where the different possibilities are identified and appraised), aiming at highlighting uncertainties rather than ignoring them, might be a promising way to pursue this alternative methodology of SA.
Conclusion
This paper intends to be a critical review of the methodology of SA as well as an attempt to foster its development beyond the deterministic single-exit approach to modelling. My concern with SA follows from the fact that SA is a strategy that is actually employed by agents in their daily activities and, as such, it must be basic to any economic project conceived of as a human science.
I have tried to show that situational logic, which is widely accepted as the method of mainstream microeconomics and has even been recommended as a key component of certain heterodox research programmes in economics, is unduly constrained by its espousal of the closed-system model of economic explanation (a formalistic deductivist approach to economic explanation which attempts to theorise all reality in terms of definite enduring relationships between variables defined at the level of social events) and the consequent search for theoretical determinateness at the level of phenomena. It has been argued that such an approach is unable to give a full account of human action under uncertainty. Human action and its wider social interrelations are to be characterised in terms of a stratified, multi-layered, reality; each level being endowed with emergent properties not reducible to those of the other levels, and theoretical determinateness is not to be achieved at the level of social events, but rather by the ontic causal processes that constitute the way our structured world works. I maintain that the situational logic version of the closed-system approach to economic explanation entails an emphasis on epistemological issues and prevents SA from providing a full account of real human agents managing with the complexities and uncertainties of their life-world circumstances, where 'multiple-exit' problem-situations are pervasive. It neglects the requirement that any scientific enquiry (including economics) should be based on a sound understanding of the nature of the phenomena observed, and be designed so as to retain the maximum degree of ontological integrity. As such, I have argued, the 'single-exit' approach to provide SA with sound foundations is doomed to failure.
My argument is that a fully consistent SA, free from the constraints of situational logic and firmly grounded upon sound human ontological foundations, can be pursued if it is detached from the rationality principle, deductivism is abandoned, and a retroductive mode of inference is embraced. The endorsement of open-system theorising and of the critical realist ontology provides a way of giving substance to Bruce Caldwell's (1998, p. 467) claim that SA is an open-ended and powerful method of discovery in economics. SA, I believe, has the potential to be a fruitful method of analysis in which various scenarios with different possibilities are identified and appraised.
